DEMOCRACY grows differently on different soils. There is no universal model for democracy. If modern democracy travelled to the Arab world with a puzzling slow speed, there are reasons for it. When the Arab world bucked the global advance of democracy following the collapse of Marxism in the 1990s, it too had reasons. Today, when democracy seems to have arrived in some parts of the Arab world, long mired in undemocratic and authoritarian past, there is need to guard against premature triumphalism.
The drums of democratic change are, of course, beating. But a democratic Arab world by Western liberal standards may be long in coming, or may perhaps never come. The optimism about democratic future is mixed with fears.
The post-Cold War period saw Communist -era autocracies collapse like snowmen in a spring shower. In fact, three out of five states throughout the world embraced democracy. Every part of the globe became host to a significant democratic presence, with a single exception — the Arab world. Was this exceptionalism because of the historic baggage or colonial experience or simply because of culture and religion?
Various explanations are on offer. Some explain it in terms of a clash of civilisations. Others say democracy and Islam are like oil and water; they just do not mix. To say that Muslim culture is incompatible with democracy is too paternalistic a view that needs to be dismissed.
Edward Said, the iconic author of Orientalism offers the following explanation: “The absence of democracy is partially the result of alliances made between Western powers on one hand and minority ruling regimes or parties on the other.” Larry Diamond, author of The Spirit of Democracy says, “there is an Arab rather than a ‘Muslim’ democracy gap.”
Arabs argue that the absence of democracy is the result of an artificial territorial division of the Middle East by Europe’s First World War victors which created disparate societies with inevitable internal conflicts and allowed foreign-backed autocrats to rule. Massive amounts of foreign aid cemented that bargain.
It is, of course, easy to blame the foreign powers — from the Mongols to the Ottoman Empire, European colonialists, the United States and Israel — for the democratic deficit in the region. What about the people living at ease with “controlled democratisation”, the power structure that was centred around what was labeled as dimuqratita-al-khubz (democracy of bread)? Under this model, there existed a social contract in which the ruling dispensation provided social and economic welfare in return for political loyalty. Mubarak, Assad, Gaddafi, Saddam, they all practiced that model.
The region’s oil and gas helped to lubricate the bank accounts of dictators, got them the security forces to do the dirty job and emboldened them to buy off political dissent. The Arab ruling elite also used lack of progress in resolving the Palestinian issue as a cover to stall democracy demands.
The ouster of dictators is no guarantee of democracy taking roots in the desert of Arabia. Democracy is a tender plant that needs to be nursed. As Ron Chapman, a popular Dallas radio personality, says, “You cannot plant pineapples in the Arctic. Likewise, you cannot assume democracy will flourish in a region that has no history of representative government, individual freedoms, or human rights”.
The American Revolution took 25 years to run its full cycle. After 11 years of riots and tension, Americans finally drafted the Declaration of Independence. The Russian revolution started in 1917 with the overthrow of Czar Nicholas. It too began with a call for freedom. Unfortunately, that was soon followed by the Bolshevik revolution. It took 73 years for that revolution to run its course. And with what result? True democracy still eludes the Russian people.
It would be unrealistic, therefore, to expect democracy to suddenly spring from the desert sands of the Arabia. The Arab world will do well to learn the lessons from the various colour revolutions. The Arab spring has been likened to the Eastern European revolution of 1989. Even though the comparison is perhaps not too apt, the lessons from that experience, particularly from colour revolutions are very significant.
The 1989 revolution was a multiple revolution — which led to an implosion of a system (the command economy), the fall of an empire (the Warsaw pact), the withering of a state (the Soviet Union) and the collapse of a global ideology (Soviet communism).
The colour revolutions that followed in countries like Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) provide important lessons. Though each national experience was distinct, there were also some common features. The colour revolutions followed fraudulent elections by semi-autocratic regimes.
Though popular mobilisation was the driving force, the colour revolutions were also led by individuals who had already occupied high political positions. For example, Mikhail Saakashvili had been Georgia’s Justice Minister during Eduard Shevardnadze’s period as President before becoming the “rose revolution’s figurehead; Viktor Yushchenko had been Ukraine’s Prime Minister before the “orange revolution”. So was Kurmanbek Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan.
However, the differences between the colour revolutions and the Arab uprising may be more instructive. In Georgia and Ukraine, people rebelled against political remnants of the Soviet era. The anger was against the old rulers unable to reform the political system and modernise the economy.
Georgia and Ukraine looked upon the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania as a model, while they had barely begun a “transition” to western-style democracy and market economy. A peaceful revolution was a way to announce their detachment from the older generations for failing to be “modern” and “western”.
By contrast, the sheer hopelessness of the people especially youth against the tyrant rulers helped to drive the Arab movement. The social media too played a role in galvanising various groups. The west encouraged, supported, even financed the popular revolt in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. In the case of the Arab rebellion the West was nowhere on the scene. In fact, the West will be too nervous if these movements threaten the oil Sheikhdoms, particularly Saudi Arabia, for fear of disastrous consequences for its own economy.
The Arab democrats will also do well to learn from the outcome of the colour revolutions. The overthrow of an old dictator does not lead to a change in the system. In Ukraine, the post-orange revolution president Viktor Yushchenko failed to bring much change beyond holding free elections. Soon his rival Viktor Yanukovich captured power. In Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili established a centralised government where Parliament was under the complete control of the ruling party, and the media had even less freedom after the change. In other words, the end result of the rose revolution in Georgia strongly resembles the starting point of Arab revolt.
The Arab revolution has started to lose momentum. While Gaddafi is proving to be a hard nut to crack, the US is not keen to destabilise the Assad regime in Syria. The Egyptians are now realising that the military is either unwilling or incapable of ushering in an era of true democratic reform.
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