CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA- STRING OF PEARLS

South Asia, due to its strategic importance, is considered by China as part of its extended periphery. PRC perceives India as a rival and views the latter’s strategic posturing directed towards seeking hegemony in the region, exercising control in the Indian Ocean and containing China, while striving to emerge as a military power. China’s strategic interests in south Asia are largely economic. In consonance with the expansion of its strategic space, China has deepened its influence in India’s neighbourhood. China’s march into south Asia gained momentum when it went for market economy in the 1980s, opening new vistas beyond Pakistan. Salient facets that merit attention are:

• Beijing has an enduring strategic partnership with Islamabad. Change in the political leadership or shift in policies in either country has had no impact on continuing mutual trust and cooperation. Pakistan’s strategic significance is priceless for China, especially in the zero sum game orchestrated by Beijing in the Indian subcontinent. While denying access to southwest and central Asia, Pakistan has provided a direct link to China with Eurasia through the Karakoram highway. Presence of PLA soldiers in the Gilgit area for infrastructure projects has added new dimension to the military cooperation between the two countries. The Gwadar Port, where PRC has made huge investments, provides Beijing direct linkage to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir to tie down a large number of Indian troops dilutes India’s capabilities against China.
• Bangladesh is a doorway for China to India’s northeast and both share a common ground on many issues. China values Bangladesh for its immense natural gas reserves, accessibility and geographic proximity to Myanmar. PRC has extended lucrative economic packages for infrastructure development and socio-economic needs of Bangladesh. China is a also a major supplier of arms and equipment to Bangladesh.
• Nepal’s strategic location is of immense importance to PRC, which has cultivated Kathmandu as part of its larger security agenda. With construction of the “Friendship Highway” from Lhasa to Kathmandu, China has gained strategic access into south Asia. The proposed extension of the Qinghai-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu will further enhance the connectivity. There is also active defense cooperation between the two countries. PRC has always sought to use Nepal as a counter-weight to India and ensure Kathmandu’s neutrality in a Sino-Indian standoff.
• China cherishes bilateral relations with Colombo given Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka is also crucial to China for implementing its “String of Pearls” strategy. Close relations between the two serves China’s interest in obviating Indian predominance. Colombo is a major beneficiary of Beijing’s economic and military assistance.
• As for Sino-Indian interface, there is definite concern regarding the concurrent rise of the two big powers. The relations between the two giants are complex and marked by contradictions. Despite the agreement on confidence building measures with regards to the boundary dispute, there is underlying antagonism, suspicion and trust deficit. In India the perception is that China has persistently endeavoured to deny it the deserved stakes in the international arena. The boundary issue and Dalai Lama’s presence in India are two major irritants in bilateral relations. Chinese officials attach considerable importance to India’s military capability and its impact on the periphery, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region.